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INTRODUCTION
The digital media revolution continues to evolve and challenge
traditional notions of copyright protection. Media content companies
and artists are very concerned as broadband access continues to become
pervasive, leading to ubiquitous high-speed Internet access that permit
gigabytes of copyrighted digital content to be shared across peer-to-peer
networks without any remuneration to the artists or content companies
who create such content. In response to this problem, Congress enlarged
the reach of federal copyright law in 1998 with the passage of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) l to address the use of advanced
technologies to bypass copyright protection mechanisms. In practice,
however, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA2 have stifled a
wide variety of activities, rather than prohibit copyright piracy. As a
result, the DMCA has evolved into a serious threat to important public
policy priorities including free speech, scientific research, fair use, and
the promotion of competition and innovation.
The traditional goal of copyright protection is to promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts by giving the author a constitutionally
mandated short-term monopoly protecting the work against unauthorized
t J.D. Candidate, Cornell University Law School, 2005; M.S., University of Rochester,
1998; M.B.A., University at Buffalo, 1991; B.S., University at Buffalo, 1988. I would like to
thank my wife, Justine, for her enduring support, patience, and encouragement.
1 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
2 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (2000).
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infringement. 3 The grant of exclusive rights of expression entails the
limitation of expressive conduct by others, thus creating a First Amend-
ment problem if the Constitution did not grant copyright protection. As a
preemptive strike against unauthorized digital content sharing, copyright
owners began to employ technological measures, often referred to as
"digital rights management" (DRM) systems, to protect their digital
works and control access to those works. The DMCA actually encour-
ages copyright owners to utilize DRM systems by providing copyright
owners with legal remedies against parties who circumvent those mea-
sures and against the suppliers of devices or technologies that facilitate
such circumvention. 4 However, DRM systems unduly shift the preexist-
ing balance of interests toward copyright holders and away from copy-
right consumers and the public at large.
Theoretically, the use of DRM systems would allow a work with an
expired copyright to remain protected forever by restricting consumer
access through technology. For example, the DRM system used on
DVDs enforces a "view-only" rule by using an encryption algorithm that
is licensed to device manufacturers by the movie studios for a nominal
fee on the condition that the algorithm is kept from the public.5 The
reinforcement of such a system by the DMCA effectively gives copyright
holders the power to control all downstream uses of content and there-
fore challenges the fair use doctrine of copyright. This, in turn, harms
consumers by limiting their ability to enjoy legally acquired copyrighted
content, raising First Amendment concerns.
The Supreme Court thought it settled the legitimacy of consumer
copying when it held that home videotaping of copyrighted commercial
television programs was fair use.6 Congress legitimized consumer copy-
ing when it recognized the right of consumers to make home recordings
of music. 7 However, the DMCA encouragement of DRM technologies
casts considerable doubt on the validity of those previously settled activi-
ties as well as on the copying and file-sharing facilitated by the Internet
and peer-to-peer networks.
Congress enacted the DMCA in response to two distinct pressures.
First, the legislature was attempting to respond to the perceived need for
the United States to implement obligations imposed by the 1996 World
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
5 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436-38 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Openlaw DVD/DeCSS Forum Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQ) List, Section 3 - Technical Questions, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/open
law/DVD/dvd-discuss-faq.html (on file with author).
6 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
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Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty.8 Second, the
DMCA was a response to the growing concern from copyright owners
regarding the pirating of digital content in a networked world. Section
1201 of the Act is comprised of two distinct prohibitions: a ban on acts
of circumvention and a ban on the distribution of tools and technologies
used for circumvention. 9
The first prohibition, set out in Section 1201(a)(1), forbids the cir-
cumvention of DRM systems and other technological measures used by
copyright owners to control access to their works.10 The ban on acts of
circumvention applies even where the intent behind such acts is the oth-
erwise legitimate decryption of a copyrighted work. For example, com-
mercially released movies in VHS format allow consumers to fast
forward through previews that preface the feature presentation. How-
ever, some movies released on DVDs restrict the consumer from making
this choice and any efforts to circumvent this restriction would be unlaw-
ful under the DMCA. 11
The second prohibition, contained in sections 1201(a)(2) and
1201(b), make it illegal to manufacture, sell or distribute tools and tech-
nologies that make circumvention possible.' 2 These provisions ban both
technologies that defeat access controls, as well as technologies that de-
feat use-restrictions imposed by copyright owners, such as copy controls.
Consequently, these provisions prevent technology vendors from taking
steps to defeat the "copy-protection" now appearing on many music
CDs. In addition, the music industry has begun deploying "copy-pro-
tected CDs" that curtail a consumer's ability to make legitimate, personal
copies of purchased music.1 3 Section 1201 also includes exceptions for
certain limited classes of activities, including security testing, reverse en-
gineering of software, encryption research, and law enforcement.
14
However, these exceptions are too narrow to be of any real use to the
intended constituencies.
Through my paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that the DMCA is
not justifiable public policy because it grants too much power to the cop-
yright holder and thus creates a chilling effect on fair use, free speech,
future innovation, and competition. Part One will examine the ramifica-
8 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/
en/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm.
9 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
10 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
11 Tom McNichol, Fighting for Copy Rights, WIRED (Jan. 2003), at http://www.wired.
corn/wired/archive/11.01/start.html?pg=13.
12 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), § 1201(b).
13 Gwendolyn Mariano, Label Releases Copy-protected CD with Pride, CNET NEws
(May 14, 2001), at http://news.com.conV2100-1023-257621.html?legacy=cnet.
14 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(g) (2000).
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tions of the DMCA on the fair use doctrine. "Fair use," a fundamental
element in American copyright law, allows a legitimate owner, without
having to ask permission, to use copyrighted works in transformative
other ways that do not unduly interfere with the copyright owner's mar-
ket for a work. ' 5 Fair uses include personal, noncommercial uses as well
as activities undertaken for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.' 6 While enforcement of
copyright protection is an important policy goal, the DMCA overextends
this protection. Copyright owners can effectively eliminate fair use by
utilizing DRM systems sanctioned under the DMCA and litigating
against anyone who tampers with those measures. Thus, re-writing the
copyright fundamentals developed by Congress and courts over more
than a century.
In Part Two, I will explore the impact that the DMCA has on free
speech and scientific research. For example, Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) have begun to censor discussions of copy-protection systems, pro-
grammers have removed computer security programs from their web-
sites, and security experts have stopped publishing details of their
research on security protocols.1 7 These developments may result in
weakened computer security for all users as researchers consciously
avoid certain activities for fear that they may become legally liable under
the DMCA. Ironically, this could have an impact on digital copyright
owners who rely on encryption technology to protect their work.
Part Three will examine the impact of the DMCA on innovation and
competition. Rather than battle piracy, copyright holders are using the
DMCA to deter marketplace competitors. For example, copyright hold-
ers are using the DMCA to hinder the efforts of legitimate competitors to
create interoperable products, thus resulting in increased costs for the
consumer. Several computer game publishers have invoked the DMCA
to prohibit others from using reverse engineering to create versions of
their games that would run on alternative operating systems.' 8
Experience with the "anti-circumvention" provisions of the
DMCA19 demonstrates that the statute reaches too far, chilling a wide
variety of legitimate activities in ways Congress did not intend. As tech-
nological protection measures wrap an increasing number of copyright
works, it is likely that copyright holders will apply the DMCA's anti-
15 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
16 Id.
17 See generally Niels Ferguson, Censorship in Action: Why I Don't Publish My HDCP
Results, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archive/dvd-discuss/msg14730.html (posted Aug. 16,
2001).
18 See Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
19 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000).
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circumvention provisions in further unforeseen contexts hindering the le-
gitimate activities of innovators, researchers, the press, and the public at
large.
Part Four will examine the most critical unresolved issues facing the
DMCA, such as the emergence of digital video recorders, and propose
alternative solutions to ensure the preservation of rights of copyright
owners while minimizing the negative effects of the DMCA.
I. IMPACT ON FAIR USE
Copyright holders using Digital Rights Management (DRM) tech-
nologies may threaten a wide range of consumers seeking greater control
over media they rightfully own, as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) makes unauthorized circumvention of access and copy controls
subject to criminal prosecution.20 The force of law that encourages the
use of DRM technologies could lead to copyright holders developing a
new intellectual property regime based entirely in computer code, aban-
doning traditional copyright measures for digital works. 2 1 Such a regime
is problematic because it could hinder the ability to access material that
has fallen out of copyright or prohibit the acceptable copying of copy-
righted material under a "fair use" rationale.
The fair use doctrine essentially allows the reproduction of copy-
righted material for certain uses deemed non-infringing such as "com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research."'22 To determine whether a particular use
is covered under a fair use exception, the court will analyze four factors:
1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
23
Fair use, a critical element of copyright law, stands for the principle
that the public, is entitled to use copyrighted works in transformative
ways or other ways that do not interfere with the copyright holder's mar-
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), § 1203(a) (2000), § 1204(a) (2000).
21 See generally Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095
(2003).
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
23 Id.
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ket for a work.24 Fair uses include personal, noncommercial uses, such
as using a VCR to record a television program for later viewing.2 5 While
the fair use doctrine has been successfully applied to some technology-
assisted copying,2 6 this defense has failed at other times, 27 creating an
unpredictable environment for the application of fair use. For example,
Sony has invoked the fair use doctrine as both a sword and shield by
successfully using the fair use defense to insulate its Betamax VCR prod-
uct 28 and later invoking the DMCA to threaten hobbyists who utilized
reverse-engineering techniques to build additional software functionality
for Sony's Aibo robot dog.29 However, the fair use defense has also
been successfully used against Sony by the creators of software that per-
mits Playstation games to be played on personal computers. 30
These examples illustrate the imprecise application of fair use when
applied to DRM systems and illustrate that fair use cannot be defined
with precision. The statutory four factor test codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107
includes concepts that are not easily expressed in precise business rules
such as "effect on the market" and "commercial/noncommercial. ' 31
Such ambiguity is by design because it is vital that the fair use doctrine
continue to evolve as new technologies develop. Since courts typically
have the first opportunity to apply copyright law to new technology, this
doctrine must be flexible to spare copyright owners and technologists
from having to lobby the Congress every time a new piece of technology
is developed. The fair use doctrine, therefore, plays a critical role in
allowing innovation to flourish while Congress has time to evaluate new
technologies and develop any appropriate legislative solutions.
A fair use situation typically arises when one party makes use of
another's work that he believes to be "fair" under the current circum-
stances.32 If the copyright holder disagrees with the alleged fair use of
his work, he can sue for copyright infringement and ask the court to rule
24 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477-82 (1984) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
25 See id. at 499 (using a device, capable of significant non-infringing uses as well as
infringing uses, does not infringe copyright).
26 Id.
27 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (copying of
digital music files by a person who owns the recording on a compact disc is infringing activity
not covered by fair use).
28 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417.
29 Will Knight, Aibo Custom Code Pulled From Website, NEW ScmN'nST (Oct. 30,
2001), available at http://www.newscientist.comnews/news.jsp?id99991495.
30 See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (using plaintiffs
software during the course of reverse engineering is a protected fair use, necessary to permit
defendant to make its non-infringing system function with plaintiffs system).
31 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
32 See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
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on the use. 33 However, this process is bypassed if the copyrighted work
is protected by a DRM system because the DMCA prohibits the circum-
vention of any DRM access or control system.34 Therefore, the DMCA
will force the fair use doctrine to be limited to those uses which the
courts have previously affirmed. As a result, the development of any new
uses will be hindered because the alleged infringer will not be allowed to
legally bypass the DRM system to access the underlying work. The am-
biguity of the fair use doctrine cannot flourish under such a strict inter-
pretation of DRM system circumvention codified in the DMCA. To
allow the fair use doctrine to operate as intended, DRM systems and the
DMCA must find a way to reflect the ambiguity of the doctrine and em-
brace unrealized uses of copyrighted material.
Digital Rights Management systems may be viewed as a form of
"technological self-help" that copyright holders can employ as a "hedge
against content infringement" and thus, avoid traditional forms of copy-
right protection. 35 DRM technology allows the content owner to select a
customized level of protection making the regulation of copyright con-
tent via legal sanctions less attractive. 36 When the DMCA reinforces the
use of such technological measures, content owners achieve a level of
control unattainable under a traditional copyright system.37 Given the
provisions of DMCA, it seems unlikely that digital content producers
who favor strong technological protection to fend off digital piracy
would endorse a system that offers fair use flexibility.
A copyright represents a bargain between the public and the copy-
right owner whereby the public grants certain limited exclusive rights to
the copyright owner in order to create an incentive for the production of
creative works. 38 Assuming that a copyright owner would favor techno-
logical self-help over traditional legal protection, the equilibrium of the
aforementioned bargain is thus askew since the public has lost its ability
to use DRM-protected works under a fair use scenario.
39
Proponents of technology controls often justify such measures as a
means to combat digital piracy.40 Unfortunately, the DMCA has given
digital content providers more control over copyrighted material to com-
33 See id.
34 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
35 Burk, supra note 21, at 1097.
36 See id. at 1100-01.
37 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copy-
ing, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813 (2001).
38 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39 See generally Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
393 (1999) (defines self-help systems and argues that they can develop to accommodate fair
users and also work to deter unauthorized copying).
40 See generally John Borland, Hacker Cracks Microsoft Anti-piracy Software, CNET
NEWS (Oct. 19, 2001), at http://news.com.com2100-1023-274721 .htmllegacy=cnet (news re-
2004]
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bat digital piracy at the expense of the public losing its fair use power.
Digital content producers argue that piracy must be stopped; otherwise,
the economic incentive to create additional works will disappear if a cop-
yright holder is not able to realize a return on his investment. 41 How-
ever, the software industry has thrived for years operating with minimal
technological controls; Microsoft has not been harmed by publishing
early versions of DOS and Windows without any copy protection. 42
Nonetheless, if the fair use doctrine is allowed to erode in favor of
DRM systems, there will be several negative impacts. As greater
amounts of content are delivered in digital form, there could be a possi-
ble reduction in expression to the extent that technological self-help in-
terferes with access to the underlying works. This could reduce several
fair uses of copyrighted material such as review, commentary, parody,
and scholarly use.43 The erosion of fair use could also have an impact on
innovation and competition. For example, if DRM systems restrict con-
tent access to the exclusion of complementary products, a reduction in
innovation for interoperable products could occur as DRM systems elim-
inate the incentives to create such products. Likewise, DRM systems
could be used to reduce competition by preventing others from engaging
in legitimate reverse engineering of competitive products. There are so-
cial costs as well, such as the erosion of privacy if DRM technologies
compromise user anonymity. Libraries and archives may also be af-
fected to the extent that DRM systems make the archiving of copyrighted
content more difficult.
The collision between fair use and the DMCA has been highlighted
with the introduction of "copy-protected" compact discs.44 The record-
ing industry is aggressively incorporating DRM technology on new mu-
sic releases. 45 Irrespective of the impact these systems will have on
online music swapping, they certainly will interfere with the fair use ex-
pectations of consumers. Many of these systems prohibit consumers
from creating MP3s, a digital format that allows music files to be easily
duplicated, and thus prevent consumers from "space shifting" legally
port on a software program that successfully cracked part of Microsoft's anti-piracy
technology).
41 See Alfred Hermida, Real Boss Tackles Online Piracy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2003),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/2758177.stm.
42 See generally Microsoft Investor Relations website, Microsoft fiscal year financial
history, at http://www.microsoft.com/msft/download/financialhistoryFY.xls (on file with
author).
43 17 U.S.C. § 107.
44 See Gwendolyn Mariano, Copy-Protected CDs Slide into Stores, CNET NEWS (Feb.
12, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-835841.html.
45 Id.
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purchased music to their personal computers. 46 For example, copy-pro-
tected discs will disappoint consumers who have purchased MP3 players,
despite the fact that making an MP3 copy of a compact disc for personal
use appears to be protected under copyright law.
47
Over two-hundred million copy-protected compact discs are in cir-
culation,48 but the technology has not always worked as intended. In
2003, a Princeton Ph.D. student explained how he disabled a new kind of
copy-protection technology distributed as part of a new compact disc by
holding down the "Shift" key on the keyboard when attempting to play
the disc on his personal computer.49 A strict reading of the DMCA
would suggest that this simple act could be viewed as the circumvention
of a copy-protection system.50
As more content is produced and delivered in a digital format, the
future ability to make legitimate fair uses of these works is dependant
upon the availability of tools to bypass these digital protection systems.
However, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions prohibit the distri-
bution and creation of such tools.51 While some might be tempted to use
such tools to promote piracy, the traditional solution to copyright piracy
has been prosecution under the legal regime, not a wholesale ban on
tools that may potentially enable fair use.52
Unfortunately, some fair use tools have already been removed from
the market. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, eight major
motion picture companies brought a DMCA suit against several defend-
ants, including Eric Coley who published a magazine and maintained an
affiliated website, seeking to block the defendants from publishing links
to a software program which defeated the encryption used on DVD mov-
ies. 53 The website, which was not involved in the development of the
program, made the software tool available during its ongoing coverage of
the DMCA controversy. 54 The district court permanently barred the
46 See John Borland, Right Issue Dogs CD Protection, CNET NEWS (Jan. 13, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5139762.html.
47 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that ripping MP3's from legally-acquired compact discs and
copying them from a personal computer to a portable MP3 player facilitates personal use under
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (Act), 17 U.S.C.S. § 1001, and that such "space
shifting" is a legitimate personal use analogous to "time shifting" in Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455, (1984)).
48 Borland, supra note 46.
49 See John Borland, Shift Key Breaks CD Copy Locks, CNET NEWS (Oct. 7, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5087875.html.
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
51 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(l)(A) (2000).
52 See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 683-84 (2000).
53 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
54 Id. at 214-15.
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magazine from publishing, or even linking to, the code, and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 55
Despite the ruling in Reimerdes, there are many legitimate reasons
to copy DVDs. Once the video is transferred to a personal computer,
many fair uses become possible. For example, film makers could take
public domain content from another region and create a digital derivative
work; consumers could fast-forward through the commercials that pref-
ace many films. Without the tools necessary to copy DVDs, however,
these fair uses become impossible.
While it may be too early to draw final conclusions, it is plain that
DRM technologies, backed by the force of the DMCA, pose a serious
potential threat to fair use. While technical refinements may address or
minimize some of the social costs that stem from an erosion of fair use, it
is unlikely that they will entirely resolve the tension. The issue then
becomes one of trade-offs, not reconciliation. With its passage of the
DMCA, Congress has essentially delegated copyright law for digital con-
tent to copyright owners and DRM vendors. Such a regime is not likely
to produce beneficial results for the public.
II. IMPACT ON FREE SPEECH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
A number of copyright owners are using the DMCA to stifle free
speech and legitimate scientific research. In response to DMCA liability
fears, online service providers and bulletin board operators have begun to
censor discussions of copy-protection systems, programmers have re-
moved security programs from their websites, and academics have
stopped publishing the details of their research on security protocols.56
Foreign scientists are increasingly uneasy about traveling to the United
States out of fear of possible DMCA liability, and certain technical con-
ferences have begun to relocate overseas. 57 These developments may
ultimately result in weakened security for all computer users as security
researchers shy away from research that might violate the DMCA.
The ubiquity of the Internet and its evolution as a communications
tool accessible by the masses raise new questions regarding the constitu-
tional right to Freedom of Speech in cyberspace. The First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' 58 Before imposing any
content-based restriction of speech, the First Amendment and interpreta-
tive case law require that the federal government meet a high level of
55 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 346, affid sub
nom Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434-35 (2d Cir. 2001).
56 See Ferguson, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archive/dvd-discuss/msg14730.html.
57 See discussion infra pp. 18-19.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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scrutiny.59 In the first Supreme Court case dealing with communication
on the Internet, Reno v. ACLU, the Court affirmed that online speech
deserves as much protection as off-line speech. 60
However, powerful media entities have successfully invoked the
DMCA as a sword to chill speech without having to meet any level of
scrutiny, much less the heightened one accorded off-line speech. One of
the earliest challenges to online freedom of speech foreclosed by the
DMCA occurred in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, where eight
major movie studios sought to enjoin a web publisher from providing
links to sites carrying a piece of software that the studios perceived to be
a threat to the movie industry.61 Eric Corley, one of the defendants in the
case, published a magazine "2600: The Hacker Quarterly" and operated
an auxiliary website entitled "2600.com. ' '62 In January 2000, the movie
studios sued Corley for publishing an article on his website which ex-
plained that a software program called DeCSS could be used to copy
DVDs.63 The studios objected to hypertext links provided in the article
that would take the reader to a website where the controversial code
could be downloaded. 64
DeCSS was developed by Norwegian teenager Jon Johansen and
immediately drew a great deal of interest from the Linux open source
community. 65 Linux is a fledging operating system that is freely distrib-
uted, and its source code may be modified by anyone who chooses to
work on it, provided that others can view the underlying programming
code. 66 Movies released in the DVD format are protected by a security
system called the Contents Scramble System (CSS). 6 7 Under the CSS
scheme, movie data embedded in the DVD disks is encrypted and may
only be decrypted and played back for viewing on an authorized DVD
player or computer hard drive that has a licensed CSS key. 68 The Linux
operating system was developed via a global volunteer network, resulting
in the lack of central ownership and thus prohibiting the ability to license
59 See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
60 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
61 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
62 Carl S. Kaplan, Norwegian Teenager Appears at Hacker Trial He Sparked, N.Y.
TIMES CYBER LAW JOURNAL (July 20, 2000), available at http://archive.nytimes.con/iibrary/
tech/00/07/cyber/cyberlaw/21 law.html.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Some companies distribute Linux as part of a commercial package with Linux-com-
patible utilities. An example of one such company is Red Hat (http://www.redhat.com).
67 Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Openlaw DVD/DeCSS Forum Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ) List, supra note 5.
68 Id.
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CSS for DVD playback. 69 In an effort to develop an open-source
software player that would allow people to play their lawfully purchased
DVDs on computers running the Linux operating system, Johansen cre-
ated DeCSS to allow Linux users the same functionality afforded non-
Linux users.70
Regardless of any benefits accruing to Linux users, the New York
District Court and the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals viewed Johansen's
program as a tool to infringe the copyrights of DVD publishers. 71 Dis-
trict Court Judge Kaplan sided with the movie studios and ordered Cor-
ley to remove all links to DeCSS from his website. 72 In his opinion,
Kaplan held that DeCSS circumvented the CSS access-control scheme,
thereby violating the "anti-circumvention" provision of the DMCA.73
Additionally, the court found that Corley violated the "anti-trafficking"
provision of the DMCA by providing links to sites from which users
could download DeCSS.74 Although Corley did not have an actual copy
of DeCSS available for download at his website, the court's injunction
prohibiting him from providing DeCSS links violated his freedom of
speech without passing the traditional high level of scrutiny test required
to justify a content-based speech restriction.75 The New York Times, the
San Jose Mercury News, the Village Voice, and several other main-
stream news outlets also reported the issue and linked to DeCSS.76
In an attempt to justify its position, the Court of Appeals held that
the code used was protected speech, but the functional aspect of the
speech was targeted and thus survived intermediate scrutiny. 77 In the
court's view, the capacity of DeCSS to accomplish unauthorized and un-
lawful access necessarily limited the scope of First Amendment protec-
tion available. 78 The court stated that DeCSS had both speech and non-
speech components, and the linking injunction targeted only the non-
speech component. 79 Nonetheless, the injunction prohibited Corley from
sharing information he felt was newsworthy, and thus his cyberspace
freedom of speech was violated. This decision was in stark contrast to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Reno v. ACLU.80
69 See generally The Linux Home Page, at http://www.linux.org.
70 Kaplan, supra note 62.
71 Reimerdes, I I I F. Supp. 2d at 346.
72 Id. at 347. ,
73 Id. at 346.
74 Id.
75 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
76 Carl S. Kaplan, Is Linking Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES CYBER LAW JOURNAL (June 16, 2000),
available at http://archive.nytimes.com/library/techl0O/06/cyber/cyberlaw/16law.html.
77 Corley, 273 F.3d at 442.
78 Id. at 453.
79 Id. at 456-58.
80 520 U.S. 1113 (1997).
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Another crucial test of the constitutional limits of the DMCA oc-
curred in United States v. Elcom Ltd.81 This case was launched in 2001
when a Russian software company employee was arrested during a con-
ference in Las Vegas after delivering a presentation that described his
company's software. 82 The product was designed to unlock protections
on Adobe Systems' eBooks that bound digital content to only one de-
vice.83 Although the Russian company faced charges of violating the
DMCA for its actions related to the design and marketing of software
that could bypass eBook copyright protections, this program allowed
users to enjoy legally-purchased eBook content on more than one de-
vice.84 For example, the Adobe technology prohibited a user from mak-
ing a copy of legally-acquired content for use on his laptop if the original
version resided on his desktop computer.85
In its defense, ElcomSoft claimed that Section 1201(b) of the
DMCA 86 was unconstitutionally vague and that the statute violated the
First Amendment because it constituted a content-based restriction on
speech not sufficiently tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 87
The Russian company also asserted that Section 1201(b) was unconstitu-
tional because it impermissibly infringed the First Amendment rights of
third parties to engage in fair use and because it was too vague in
describing what speech it prohibits.88 Finally, the company argued that
Congress exceeded its constitutional power in enacting the DMCA.89
The court held that Section 1201(b) was not unconstitutionally
vague because it allowed a person to conform his or her conduct to a
comprehensible standard. 90 The court also held that the governmental
interests in enacting the DMCA were both legitimate and substantial and
did not burden considerably more speech than was necessary to achieve
those interests. 9' The court finally held that the DMCA was not uncon-
stitutionally vague on its face and that Congress did not exceed its power
in enacting it.92 While the jury found that ElcomSoft's program was
81 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
82 Jeff German, Russian Software Developer Arrested in Vegas, LAS VEGAS SUN (July
18, 2001), available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/lv-crime/200l/jul18/51209
6646.html.
83 Id.
84 Id.; Joanna Glasner, Verdict Seen As Blow to DMCA, WIRED (Dec. 18, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,56898,00.html.
85 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-18.
86 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2000).
87 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
88 Id. at 1134.
89 Id. at 1137.
90 Id. at 1136-37.
91 Id. at 1132.
92 Id. at 1137, 1141-42.
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illegal, the jury acquitted the company of all charges after determining
that the company did not willfully intend to violate the DMCA.
93
Since the arrest of the ElcomSoft employee, foreign scientists have
expressed concerns about traveling to the United States.94 Some have
even advocated boycotting conferences held in the U.S., and a number of
conference bodies have decided to move their conferences to non-U.S.
locations. 95 In fact, Russia has issued a travel warning to Russian pro-
grammers traveling to the U.S.96 Highly respected British Linux
programmer Alan Cox resigned from the USENIX committee of the Ad-
vanced Computing Systems Association, the committee that organizes
many of the U.S. computing conferences. 97 Cox referred to concerns
about traveling to the U.S. as one of the reasons for his resignation and
urged USENIX to hold its annual conference offshore. 98
Section 1201 of the DMCA 99 is also being used to stifle legitimate
scientific research. Ironically, computer security research is a major area
where the oppressive impact of the DMCA is most felt. In response to
concerns from technologists that earlier drafts of the DMCA could have
the potential to outlaw the necessary research and testing required to
build computer security products, 100 Congress included two narrow ex-
ceptions in the DMCA for encryption research and security testing. 0 1
However, these exceptions are too narrow: computer scientists, entangled
in litigation, divert from security research while trying to comply with
the DMCA.' 0 2 These developments will ultimately result in weakened
security for all computer users as security researchers shy away from
useful work that might violate the DMCA. In fact, Richard Clarke, the
head of the White House Office of Cyberspace Security, recently called
93 Lisa M. Bowman, ElcomSoft Verdict: Not Guilty, CNET NEWS (Dec. 17, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-978176.html.
94 Will Knight, Computer Scientists Boycott US over Digital Copyright Law, NEW Sci-
ENTIST, July 23, 2001.
95 Id.
96 Jennifer Lee, Travel Advisory for Russian Programmers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001,
at C4.
97 Alan Cox Resigns from Usenix ALS Committee, Cites DMCA, NEWsFORGE (July 20,
2001) at http://www.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=01/07/20/1228200.
98 Id.
99 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
100 See Jonathan Band, Congress Unknowingly Undermines Cyber-security, SILICON VAL-
LEY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/
4750224.htm.
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000).
102 See Professor Ross Anderson, Cambridge University, Declaration in Felten v. RIAA
(Oct. 22, 2001) (describing ways in which the DMCA is suppressing research into security
weaknesses in SDMI watermarking technology), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
Felten_v_RIAA/20011022_andersondecl.pdf.
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for an amendment to the DMCA because of its "chilling effect on vul-
nerability research." 103
The threat to scientific research has been highlighted by the efforts
of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Se-
cure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) Foundation to utilize the DMCA to
suppress academic research. SDMI is a multi-industry group, formed
largely at the instigation of the RIAA to develop technical standards for
"watermarks" and compliant devices, whose charter is "to develop open
technology specifications that protect the playing, storing, and distribut-
ing of digital music such that a new market for digital music may
emerge."'104 In September 2000, SDMI issued a public challenge to en-
courage technologists to attempt to defeat certain digital rights manage-
ment (DRM) watermarking technologies intended to protect digital
music. 10 5 Professor Edward Felten of Princeton University's Computer
Science Department and a team of researchers from Princeton, Rice, and
Xerox subsequently succeeded in removing the DRM technology. 106
Felten and his team documented their findings in an academic pa-
per, including weaknesses of the SDMI watermarking system, and
planned to present their findings at an academic conference. 107 Execu-
tives at SDMI and the RIAA attempted to persuade Felten to remove
certain sections of the paper, especially those critical of the SDMI DRM
system. 10 8 Felten and his team refused because they felt these details
were necessary to support their scientific findings.10 9 SDMI and the
RIAA then invoked the DMCA and asserted that any presentation of the
paper at the academic conference would subject the researchers and their
institutions to liability and threatened legal action unless the research
team withdrew the paper. 110 As a direct result of the DMCA threat,
Felten and his team grudgingly withdrew their paper from the confer-
ence, preventing other technology researchers from learning about the
weaknesses of the SDMI watermarking system.' 1 Thus, the DMCA had
a chilling effect on the sharing of scientific research.
The use of the DMCA to suppress the sharing of scientific research
in situations like those found in Elcom 12 and Professor Felten's paper is
103 Band, supra note 100.
104 http://www.sdmi.org.
1O5 See Thomas C. Greene, Felten Spills the SMDI Beans, THE REGISTER (Aug. 16, 2001),
at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/21086.html.
106 See id.
107 See Pamela Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science, SCIENCE, Sept.
14, 2001, at 2028.
108 See id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See id.
112 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
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forcing many researchers to reconsider publication of their results. Such
restrictions could have a deleterious effect on the computer security in-
dustry in the United States, as foreign researchers avoid publication and
conference participation for fear of being prosecuted under the DMCA.
A Dutch cryptographer recently refused to publish news of an alleged
flaw in some technology designed to protect digital video developed by
Intel.' 13 The researcher cited fear of prosecution under the DMCA as the
basis for refusing to divulge specific details regarding the flaw, stating:
"I have decided to censor myself and not publish this paper for fear of
prosecution and/or liability under the U.S. DMCA law."' 1
4
The DMCA pushes the limits of constitutionality when copyright
holders are allowed to use the Act as a sword to suppress speech and the
free exchange of ideas. This is especially notable in the computer secur-
ity industry, which could reap tremendous benefits if the anti-circumven-
tion measures of the DMCA were less restrictive and allowed researchers
the opportunity to benefit from the work of others. As a leader in infor-
mation technology products, the United States cannot afford to have its
academic pipeline of research chilled by the overly oppressive provisions
of the DMCA.
Ill. IMPACT ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
Copyright holders may use the DMCA to stifle innovation and re-
duce competition in the marketplace by hindering the efforts of legiti-
mate competitors attempting to develop interoperable products. Such use
of the Act will lead to DMCA-endorsed monopolies, which will ulti-
mately leave consumers with fewer choices and higher prices. For exam-
ple, Blizzard Entertainment and parent company Vivendi-Universal have
recently invoked the DMCA in an effort to intimidate the developers of a
software program derived from legitimate reverse engineering. 115 The
company alleges that the software, which allows users to compete
against each other in Blizzard video games over the Internet, violates
both the DMCA's prohibition on circumventing access control measures
and Blizzard's end user license agreements (EULAs). 116 The verbose
EULAs, which users of such games must accept, contain sweeping re-
strictions on reverse engineering, decompilation, and disassembly.
17
Here, the company has used the DMCA to deter a marketplace competi-
tor rather than to battle piracy.
113 See Lisa M. Bowman, Researchers Weigh Publication, Prosecution, CNET NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-271712.html?legacy=cnet.
114 See id.
115 See Blizzard Entertainment v. Internet Gateway, Inc., No. 4:02CV00498CAS (E.D.
Mo. filed Apr. 5, 2002).
116 Id.
'17 Id.
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On its face, the DMCA's prohibition would prevent reverse engi-
neering of measures that control access to a copyrighted work since cir-
cumvention is generally required for reverse engineering. The DMCA
contains a limited exception to the ban on circumvention, which permits
reverse engineering of the technology by specific classes for limited pur-
poses." 8 The exception allows reverse engineering of computer pro-
grams if the reverse engineer lawfully obtains the program, seeks
permission from the copyright owner, uses the results of his efforts only
to create an interoperable computer program, and does not publish the
results." 9 However, the resulting program must only interoperate with
the reverse engineered software and cannot interoperate with the techno-
logically-protected content such as movies, books, and video games.120
As a result, reverse engineers must carefully consider their planned work
because this exception is far too narrow to be useful for many reverse
engineering needs.
It is fair to say that eliminating all competition from an industry is
not what Congress intended when it promulgated the DMCA, but that is
precisely the effect this legislation is having on the laser printer toner
aftermarket. Lexmark, the second-largest printer vendor in the U.S., has
long tried to eliminate aftermarket laser printer toner vendors that offer
toner cartridges at prices below Lexmark's. 121 It is well known within
that industry that toner and ink cartridge sales represent the most profita-
ble items for such manufacturers. 22
Lexmark devised a clever way to force buyers of its printers to use
only the company's brand of replacement toner cartridges. A Lexmark
printer will run only if the toner cartridge has a computer chip that sends
an authentication sequence to the printer that identifies the cartridge as
manufactured by Lexmark.123 If a user installs a less-expensive toner
cartridge from another manufacturer, the machine will not function. In
December 2002, Lexmark invoked the DMCA as a new weapon in its
arsenal and brought suit against printer microchip manufacturer Static
Control Components. 124 Lexmark sought to prohibit Static from selling
chips it claimed were "technology" which "circumvented" certain "au-
thentication routines" between Lexmark toner cartridges and printers.1 25
118 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000).
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See Declan McCullagh, Lexmark Invokes DMCA in Toner Suit, CNET NEWS (Jan. 8,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-979791.html.
122 See Peter Judge, HP Admits It's the Ink That Counts, ZD NET UK (Mar. 7, 2002), at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/hardware/0,39020351,2106094,00.htm.
123 See McCullagh, supra note 121.
124 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 02-571-K5F (E.D. Ky.
filed Dec. 30, 2002).
125 Id.
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Lexmark added these authentication routines explicitly to hinder
aftermarket toner vendors, but the defendant had reverse-engineered
these software measures and marketed "Smartek" chips that enabled
aftermarket cartridges to work in Lexmark printers.126 Though the Ninth
Circuit Court previously supported the use of reverse engineering for in-
termediate copying of software code, 127 the District Court granted
Lexmark a preliminary injunction prohibiting Static Control from the
manufacture and sale of these chips. 128 However, the Sixth Circuit re-
cently overturned the decision to grant Lexmark an injunction and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. 129
Even just the threat of litigation for DMCA violations has been
enough to stifle innovation. Apple Computer invoked the Act in August
2002 to prevent customers from burning DVDs on external drives.' 30
The main issue involved Apple's iDVD application, which allows users
to burn DVDs only on internal drives manufactured by the company.131
The program does not permit users to burn content to external drives
manufactured by third parties. 132 This has essentially stranded Apple
owners with older computers or laptops because they cannot use iDVD
to save their work. Apple is highly motivated to sell new hardware since
equipment sales comprise eighty-five to ninety percent of the company's
quarterly revenue,1 33 and thus has locked customers into a proprietary
hardware upgrade.
As a result of this backwards incompatibility, Other World Comput-
ing began bundling a product called DVD Enabler with an external drive
that modified iDVD so the application would save completed DVDs to a
FireWire-connected drive. 134 Apple subsequently threatened Other
World with legal action, asserting that the company's product was a vio-
lation of the DMCA. 135 Other World responded by withdrawing DVD
Enabler immediately from the market. 136 Since only Apple-manufac-
126 See McCullagh, supra note 121.
127 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating
"that where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seek-
ing such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law").
128 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 974
(E.D. Ky. 2003).
129 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22250
(6th Cir. 2004).
t30 See Declan McCullagh, Apple: Burn DVDs-and We'll Burn You, CNET NEWS (Aug.
28, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-955805.html.
131 Id.
t32 Id.
133 Id.
134 McCullagh, supra note 130.
135 Id.
136 See id.
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tured internal drives can utilize iDVD, this will force consumers to
purchase more computers since Apple does not offer this product as an
upgrade.
As content providers have developed technological methods to re-
strict access to content legally acquired from different parts of the
world, 137 the DMCA has been invoked to support these measures and
thereby prohibit consumers from legitimately using this content. Sony
has sued a number of manufacturers of so-called "mod chips" for alleged
circumvention under the DMCA. 138 By invoking this strategy, Sony has
been able to enforce a system of geographical regional restrictions rais-
ing significant anticompetitive issues.
"Mod chips" are after-market accessories that modify Sony Playsta-
tion consoles to allow games legitimately purchased in one part of the
world to be played on a Playstation console from another geographic
region. 139 In the U.S., Sony sued Gamemasters, Inc., distributor of the
Game Enhancer peripheral device, which allowed U.S. Playstation users
to play games purchased in Japan and other countries. 140 The court
granted Sony's injunction under the DMCA's anti-circumvention provi-
sions, thereby effectively banning the use of a technology that would
permit consumers to use non-infringing games that were legitimately
purchased from other regions. 141 While Sony has argued that mod chips
can enable the use of unauthorized copies of Playstation games, 142 mod
chips are capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 143 Consequently,
public policy should weigh the use of the DMCA to enforce Sony's re-
gion coding system, which prohibits the use of games legally purchased
in other countries against any potentially illegitimate uses for such mod
chips.
Like the chilling effect that the DMCA has had over scientific re-
search, similar impacts are felt in the commercial setting. To encourage
innovation and the development of interoperable products, access to cop-
yright protected works must be allowed for reverse engineering purposes.
137 See Sony Computer Entm't Am., 87 F. Supp. 2d 976; Corley, 273 F.3d at 451-53
(noting that the policy judgments require some legitimate uses of computer programs to be
restricted because illicit use, which is the most frequent type of use, would be substantially
harmful).
138 See Sony Computer Entm't Am., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 977; see also Tony Smith, Judge
Deems PS2 Mod Chips Illegal in UK, THE REGISTER (July 21, 2004) (noting Sony's many suits
to curtail the use of mod chips), available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/ps2-
modchipwin.
139 See Sony Computer Entm't Am., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 981; see also Mod-chip.com, at
http://www.mod-chip.com/faq_new.htm#10 (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
140 See Sony Computer Entm't Am., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 981-83.
141 Id. at 987-88.
142 See id. at 982.
143 See Mod-chip.com, at http://www.mod-chip.com/en/faq.htm#al (last visited Nov. 13,
2004).
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The current anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are too restric-
tive and consequently will decrease the amount of innovation. If such
policies continue unfettered, a monopolistic polarization of technology
will evolve, creating a digital divide between copyright haves and have-
nots.
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In the absence of meaningful industry standards and agreements for
the protection of digital content, the courts have stepped in and allowed
the DMCA to be used as a sword against alleged infringers. However,
these actions have created a set of confusing rulings that make it ex-
tremely difficult for a technologist to predict how the courts will rule on
the use or development of new technologies. For example, two recent
file-sharing cases have produced opposite results, which have created un-
certainty regarding the application of the DMCA. In MGM Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., the court analyzed Grokster's peer-to-peer (P2P) file
sharing network, which allowed users to share copyrighted digital con-
tent over the Internet, similar to the original Napster service. 144 The
court held that the decentralized nature of the network limited Grokster's
liability for the action of its users and thus could not be found liable
under Section 501 of the DMCA. 145 However, the court in In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation146 found that a similar P2P file sharing system did
not fall under any of the safe harbor provisions 147 allowed in the DMCA.
The fundamental struggle with which the courts are grappling in-
volves the rights of the copyright holders versus the "fair use" rights of
content owners. The majority of the efforts to date have focused on digi-
tal music files, as illustrated by Grokster148 and Aimster,149 but the battle
will quickly expand to include digital video content as broadband con-
nections become more ubiquitous. The courts ventured into the digital
video realm in Corley,150 but that case was more about the posting and
linking of code to bypass the DVD encryption key as opposed to the
usage rights of content owners. 15 1 A major area of concern for copyright
holders is the emergence of digital video recorders (DVR), devices that
144 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031-33 (C.D. Cal. 2003) affid 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471
(9th Cir. 2004).
145 Id. at 1041-43.
146 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct.
1069 (2004).
147 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2000).
148 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
149 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 645.
150 Corley, 273 F.3d at 434.
151 See id. at 453-58.
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allow a user to record content from television programs like a video cas-
sette recorder (VCR) but store the information in digital format.
One particular device that is disconcerting to television networks
and video copyright holders is the ReplayTV 4000, the first networked
DVR with broadband connectivity that lets a user record up to 320 hours
of television, playback recorded shows without commercials, and even
share programs with other ReplayTV owners.' 52 Television networks
are concerned about the ability of the ReplayTV 4000 to edit out com-
mercials and then share this content with other users over the Internet.
153
The networks are also fearful that once programming material is captured
in a digital format, it could easily be extracted and shared over the In-
ternet via a peer-to-peer network. 154 Since digital copies are perfect cop-
ies of the original, the networks fear that users might abandon watching
television in the regular method, preferring to watch commercial-less
versions upon their convenience, which in turn would decrease the de-
mand for commercial spots from advertisers and subscription fees de-
rived from premium services. 155
In 2001, the three major television networks filed suit against the
manufacturer of the ReplayTV 4000, claiming that the device would vio-
late their copyrights by allowing users to share copies of programs over
the Internet. 156 The networks stated that the device "deprives the copy-
right owners of the means by which they are paid for their creative con-
tent and thus reduces the incentive to create programming and make it
available to the public." 157 At the time the suit was filed, the ReplayTV
device had not been released for sale to the public, but the networks
sought an injunction to prevent the DVR from coming to market.158
Ironically, the ReplayTV device does support a digital rights manage-
ment system, thus giving networks the option to prevent users from shar-
ing recorded programs.' 59
The ReplayTV case is extremely important because it will help de-
fine the limits of consumer "fair use" for DVR devices. In 1984, the
Supreme Court was faced with a similar challenge in Sony Corporation
152 ReplayTV website, at http://www.digitalnetworksna.com/dvr/5500/features.asp (last
visited Aug. 31, 2004).
153 Susan Rush, Judge Allows Consumer Voice in DVR Court Fight, CED BROADBAND
DREcT (Aug. 19, 2002), at http://www.broadbandweek.com/news/020819/0 2 0 8 19 content_
dvr.htm.
154 See id.; see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 436.
155 Rush, supra note 153.
156 Associated Press, Networks Sue Digital Recorder Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001,
available at http:/12.mrbrklyn.com/resources/AP-Networks-ReplayTV.html.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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of America v. Universal City Studios.160 In that landmark case, the Court
was asked to determine the limits of consumer fair use as applied to
VCRs-new technology at the time that threatened the traditional views
of copyright holders. 16' At the time, the entertainment industry voiced
some of the same arguments proposed by the opponents of ReplayTV,
but did not realize the enormous potential associated with the sale and
rental of videotapes which consumers could enjoy on their VCRs. In a
surprising decision, the Court held that personal taping of television pro-
grams using a VCR device was "fair use," and that the manufacturer of
such devices were not contributory infringers. 162
The suit against the manufacturer of ReplayTV was eventually
dropped for unspecified reasons, 63 but lingering questions still remain.
In fact, a group of ReplayTV owners have recently joined together to
seek a declaration regarding whether their use of the ReplayTV send-
show and commercial-skipping features constitutes fair use or is copy-
right infringement. 164 It is likely that the DMCA will be addressed dur-
ing this dispute, and prior court decisions will be heavily relied upon for
their precedential value. There are two main issues to address, namely
whether the use of the DVR device to skip commercials is permissible
and whether the sharing of recorded programs with other DVR users in-
fringes upon the rights of the copyright owner. In Sony, 165 the Court
touched upon the use of a VCR to fast forward through commercials but
did not issue a direct opinion on the matter, and instead held that per-
sonal "time-shifting" of commercial network television programs was
permissible under fair use.' 66 It is likely that a court will view the use of
the ReplayTV's commercial skipping feature in the same manner.
Based on cases like Grokster167 and Aimster, 68 it is not clear how a
court might rule regarding the file sharing capabilities of the ReplayTV.
In Grokster, the decentralized design of the file-sharing architecture was
determinative: the court decided that the P2P host could not be found
liable for infringement because it lacked knowledge of any specific in-
fringing activities.169 Unlike some infamous digital music file-swapping
networks where thousands of files can be easily shared among many
anonymous users, the ReplayTV device actually limits file-sharing so
160 464 U.S. at 417.
161 Id. at 421-25.
162 Id. at 454-56.
163 Michael Singer, Networks Drop Lawsuit Against SONICblue, CLICKZ NEWS (Nov. 27,
2001), at http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3531-929601.
164 See Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (C.D. Ca. 2002).
165 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448-50.
166 Id. at 454-56.
167 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029.
168 Aimster, 334 F.3d 643.
169 Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-38, 1045-46.
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that a recorded television broadcast cannot be sent to more than fifteen
users. 170 Also, ReplayTV users can only share files with people they
know, not with thousands of anonymous users.1 71
In the end, the question is whether the ReplayTV 4000 is more like
the Sony Betamax VCR, which the Supreme Court ruled did not infringe
copyright because the device was capable of "substantial non-infringing
uses,"' 172 or more like Napster, one of the earliest file-sharing networks
that was found to infringe copyright because it possessed knowledge of
its users' infringing activities.' 73 For a court to rule that the ReplayTV
4000 infringes copyright, a potential plaintiff must demonstrate that any
non-infringing uses of the device are insignificant. 174 However, this bur-
den of proof could be very difficult to meet since the DVR device is
capable of non-infringing uses similar to those associated with a VCR. It
is likely that a court will find that the ReplayTV device does not infringe
copyright based on much of the reasoning in Sony, provided that the file-
sharing capabilities continue to be constrained to a small group.
1 75
As new technologies emerge, the DMCA will continue to be applied
in ways that restrict many areas of copyright that have enjoyed protection
under the Copyright Act. 176 However, the DMCA is an overly broad
piece of legislation that prevents many of those privileges and needs to
be re-evaluated to balance the interests of both copyright owners and
consumers. Since the enactment of the DMCA, there have been numer-
ous cases yielding unpredictable results and consequently producing a
chilling effect on fair use, free speech, and innovation due to this uncer-
tainty. Some modification to the DMCA is necessary to mitigate these
chilling effects and allow the Copyright Act to fulfill its intended pur-
pose-namely, to promote the progress of science and useful arts.
177
Some members of Congress are beginning to realize that the DMCA
does not promote the beneficial effects of copyright protection and have
recently introduced legislation to modify the DMCA. The most promis-
ing bill is the Digital Media Consumers Rights Act, 178 introduced by
Representatives Boucher and Doolittle. One of the key features of this
bill is the limitation placed on the scope of circumvention liability, re-
stricting this liability to acts that have the sole purpose of infringing
170 Doug Isenberg, ReplayTV Lawsuit: Napster Redux?, CNET NEws (Nov. 12, 2001), at
http://news.com.com/2010-1071-281601 .html?legacy=cnet.
171 Id.
172 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417.
173 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
174 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 456.
175 See id.
176 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
177 See id.
178 Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act Section-by-Section Description, available at
http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/dmcrasec.htm.
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copyrights. 79 This will help minimize the fair use problem that is perva-
sive throughout the DMCA.
As discussed in Part Three, courts have applied the DMCA to sup-
press scientific research, resulting in a more restrictive marketplace of
ideas. Restrictions on freedom in the academic setting will ultimately
lead to less innovation; society as a whole will be worse off if the ex-
change of ideas continues to be hindered. Any modifications to the
DMCA must carefully balance the needs of copyright holders and society
to guard against any unintentional harm. Although the Digital Media
Consumers Rights Act 180 acknowledges that the DMCA must be restruc-
tured, there are other legislative solutions to consider.
The DMCA gives force of law to any DRM system utilized by a
copyright holder and consequently destroys the balance of bargaining
rights between the copyright holder and consumers.' 81 Consequently,
the rights of consumers, such as fair use and the right to make personal
copies, are circumvented by technology that the DMCA makes illegal to
bypass. However, the anti-circumvention clause of the DMCA has
proven to be an ineffective measure for thwarting digital content piracy
on the Internet.182 Although it might harm DRM and encryption technol-
ogy producers, the anti-circumvention clause should be removed in favor
of a return to traditional copyright principles.
The current version of the DMCA creates a perverse effect that en-
courages copyright holders to pursue litigation against individuals exer-
cising their fair use rights, performing reverse engineering research, or
even participating in legitimate, industry-sponsored challenges to crack a
DRM system. These cases represent an offensive use of copyright law,
as opposed to the traditional protective approach where a copyright
holder is granted a fixed-length monopoly, after which time the work
enters the public domain. Even if complete removal of the anti-circum-
vention clause does not generate enough support, modifying the language
to allow for less-restrictive fair use applications may be prudent. For
example, the clarification of non-infringing behavior in the security and
encryption industries would result in positive benefits as academic re-
searchers gain greater clarity over permissible activities. Digital security
systems can only be strengthened by the free exchange of information
and vigorous testing.
179 See id.
180 Id.
181 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
182 In the four years following the introduction of the DMCA, CD sales per capita in
United States have dropped thirty percent, suggesting that the DMCA has been ineffective in
curbing digital piracy as p2p networks have grown in popularity. See Stan Liebowitz, Pitfalls
in Measuring the Impact of File-Sharing (July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=583
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As a last alternative, Congress could elect to leave the DMCA un-
touched and allow the issues to be worked out in the courts. However,
such an approach is not preferred over a legislative amendment because
technology evolves at an extremely rapid pace while judicial solutions
are historically inexpedient. As shown in this note, the DMCA has a
chilling effect on various activities and will ultimately reduce the supply
of borderline issues that could expand the body of law. This may lead to
a stratification of current case law and see the chilling effect create a
frozen tundra of uncertainty and stagnation.
CONCLUSION
Collisions between copyright law and new technologies are part of
our copyright tradition; consider the player piano, broadcast radio, cable
TV, and the VCR. In most cases, the copyright industries have evolved
and prospered in the marketplace. On the few occasions where copyright
industries have failed to adjust, Congress has stepped in with compulsory
licensing. What Congress has not done is to regulate innovation in the
name of copyright. Policy makers should be cautious when called upon
to depart from our copyright traditions.
Copyright protection can only serve its intended purpose when the
balance between owners and consumers is maintained. The Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act destroys that balance by granting too much
power to the copyright owner. The Act is riddled with constitutional
flaws and has rendered large parts of the traditional body of copyright
law obsolete. The Act is being used as a sword to further extend the
monopoly rights of copyright holders-a result contrary to the purpose
of copyright protection. If this balance is not restored, society may find
itself on slippery slope toward a state of affairs where copyrights become
perpetual and freeze all future innovation. Society will be irreparably
harmed if the shield that previously protected the expressive rights of
society is allowed to become a sword to exert monopolistic rights on
others.
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